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1‘Framing the project’ of international human
rights law: reflections on the dysfunctional
‘family’ of the Universal Declaration
Anna Grear
‘Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of
little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters.’1
‘To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in a communicating text.’2
The task of ‘framing the project’ of international human rights law is
daunting to say the least. First, there is the sheer enormity and complexity
of the international human rights law ‘project’: adequately mapping the
subject and its key related issues is impossible in a whole book, let alone a
short chapter.3 Secondly, it is daunting because of the sense of epistemic
responsibility involved. Every framing inevitably involves selection – if not
pre-selection – through the conscious (and/or unconscious) placing of focus
upon features or factors considered to be significant and/or valuable.4 As
Gitlin puts it, framing is a way of choosing, underlining and presenting
‘what exists, what happens and what matters’. In this sense, the founding
document (or as Entman might put it, the inaugural ‘communicating text’)
of international human rights law (the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, UDHR)5 functions as a particularly potent form of framing, for it
selects aspects of perceived reality, making them not just salient but symbo-
lically central to the entire philosophical, moral, juridical order designated
by the term ‘international human rights law’.
Framings, it should be noted, are inescapable – and are always an
exercise of epistemic closure or limitation in the sense that frames tend to
1 T. Gitlin, TheWholeWorld IsWatching: MassMedia in theMaking and Unmaking of the New
Left (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press 1980) 6.
2 R.M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’ (1993) 43 (4) Journal
of Communication 51–8 at 52.
3 Joseph and McBeth point out in their editorial introduction to the Research Handbook on
International Human Rights Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2010), for example, that it is
‘simply impossible to capture’ all the relevant issues ‘in a single book’ (at xiii).
4 Not always for reasons that should count as valuable.
5 GA Res. 217(111) of 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
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draw attention to selected aspects of a perceived ‘something’ at the expense
of a host of other candidates for attention producing, in the process, a set of
muted or even invisible ‘others’ – a whole range of unfocused-upon factors,
features or (for the primary purpose of the discussion here) subjectivities.
Framing choices in international human rights law are particularly
influential. International human rights law can be understood as deploying
a power verging on the ‘anthropogenetic’ – that is to say, the power
precisely to ‘name’ (and thus discursively to ‘create’) the ‘human’ itself.
For some readers, this claim may seem counter-intuitive. After all, the
international human rights law edifice is usually understood to rest upon
the foundation of a notion of the pre-existing ‘natural’ human being. While,
however, there is a certain complex truth in the idea that the UDHR and its
normative progeny deploy the ‘human being’ as a foundational category, it
is also the case, as we shall see in the course of the reflections that follow,
that the ‘human’ of international human rights law is, in fact, a highly
complex construction taking the form of a ‘universal’ human subject which
has been observed, as we shall see, to (re)produce a range of ‘others’ as
marginalised subjects. Thus, much as a family photograph might reveal the
unconscious favouritisms or oversights of the parent holding the camera,
the framing of international human rights law’s universal subject suggests a
degree of dysfunction or fracture attending the ‘human family’ evoked by
the aspirational text of the UDHR.
This argument, however, will have to wait awhile. In ‘framing the project’
of international human rights law for the purposes of a Companion wemust
surely first introduce at least a rudimentary outline of the project drawn
from mainstream, traditional accounts and so provide an account of the
project’s broad textual self-enunciation and institutional structure.
Framing the project: traditional accounts
Traditional accounts of the international human rights law project converge
to locate it in a rich amalgam of natural law, positive law and an unprece-
dented international ‘consensus’ ‘on substantive norms with high moral
voltage’6 at the end of the SecondWorld War. It is generally agreed that the
6 B. De Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and
Emancipation (London: Butterworths 2000) 260.
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1945 UN Charter7 effectively brought human rights into the sphere of
international law – in the process achieving the simultaneous internation-
alisation of human rights and the birth of the ‘human individual’ as a
subject, rather than an object, of international law.8 This development is
generally attributed with authoritatively establishing the idea, in normative
terms at least, that ensuring respect for human rights should no longer be
entrusted solely to the power of the nation state. Ever since the relatively
sparse first enunciation in the UN Charter of an international order of
human rights, the UN has been widely seen as being instrumental in an
apparently ceaseless and expanding process of international human rights
standard-setting through an almost kaleidoscopic proliferation of instru-
ments and treaties.
Of all these instruments and treaties, however, one stands out as the
iconic matrix from which all international human rights standards take
their symbolic and juridical life: the UDHR. This UDHR is widely understood
to be the foundation of international human rights law, possessing
immense symbolic and rhetorical power and exerting a virtually ineluctable
normative traction. It is of note that no state has ever denounced the UDHR,
from themoment of its adoption (in 1948) right up until the present day. The
UDHR was affirmed, in fact, along with the universality and indivisibility of
human rights, by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action9 in
1993, and it remains the normative fulcrum for the international human
rights law project, a status consistent, arguably, with its own inaugural self-
enunciation as a ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations’.10 Since its formulation, the influence of the UDHR has been
impressive. It has been praised for giving life to an entire generation of
post-colonial states, for providing the rights-centred template for a host of
new constitutional documents, and as though this were not enough, it is
also credited with being the normative source of over 200 international
human rights instruments.11 The centrality of the UDHR as the frame within
which the international human rights project unfolds, therefore, is
7 Charter of the UN, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945.
8 See T. Buergenthal, ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human
Rights’ (1997) 19 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 703–23.
9 UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993) of 25 June 1993, endorsed by GA Res. 48/121 of 14
February 1994, [2].
10 UDHR, Preamble.
11 G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (London: The New
Press 2006) 35.
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indisputable, its practical influence undeniable: As Donnelly puts it, ‘[f]or
the purposes of international action, “human rights” means roughly “what
is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”’.12
Traditional accounts of international human rights law also emphasise a
series of phases or stages of standard-setting13 that reflect (and for the
purposes of this discussion at least) pre-figure critiques of the UDHR. The
initial vigour of the standard-setting activities reflected by the drafting of
the UDHR cooled noticeably in the light of Cold War politics, producing a
marked lull in the production of human rights documents, unbroken until
the 1965 adoption of the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),14 a development which quite nat-
urally reflected the concerns of the newly decolonised nations which were
then swelling the ranks of UN membership and beginning to influence the
preoccupations of the international community.15
In 1966, there was a fresh phase of general or universal standard-setting
through which the rights of the UDHR found further enunciation in two
international legal documents, in narrow chronological order, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)16 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).17 The dichotomous separation between these two ‘categories’ of
rights is often traditionally explained as reflecting a Cold War ideological
rift, but for many the separation also reflects perceived differences between
the categories of rights in terms of their relative justiciability, putative
operation as primarily ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ rights and relative enforce-
ability.18 Together, the UDHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR are referred to as
the ‘International Bill of Rights’, and are supplemented, further expressed
(or implicitly criticised – depending on one’s chosen frame) by further
standard-setting exercises. All of this has resulted in a proliferation of
12 J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2003) 22.
13 See Buergenthal, ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution’ 00.
14 Opened for signature 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969).
15 Joseph and McBeth, editorial introduction.
16 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January
1976).
17 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March
1976).
18 B. Turner, ‘Human Vulnerabilities: On Individual and Social Rights’, http://web.gs.emory.
edu/vulnerability/zpdfs/turnerpub.pdf (date of last access 13 July 2011).
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international human rights treaties, focusing upon either specific rights
(such as the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNCAT19) or (perhaps more critically
for present purposes) on specific rights-holders (such as the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW20).
This almost ‘carnivalistic’21 expansion in the number of international UN
human rights treaties has been accompanied, at different times and rates, by
the incremental spread and maturation of a set of regional international
human rights regimes: the European Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR22) (adopted in 1950, which embraces only
civil and political rights); the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR23) (which excluded economic and social rights but later gave them
normative space in the form of a separate protocol); The African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights (Banjul Charter24) (adopted by the Organisation
of African Unity, OAU, in 1981 – embracing all categories of right in one
culturally distinctive document). There is also a neonate and culturally
distinctive Arab and Muslim regional system (expressed in the Arab
Charter on Human Rights,25 adopted by the Council of the League of Arab
States in 1994 and which entered into force in 2008).26 No matter to what
degree such human rights regimes operate at differing stages of juridical
and institutional maturity and reflect radically differing regional and cul-
tural commitments and histories, it is notable that they all, without excep-
tion, explicitly affirm their normative continuity with the iconic UDHR.
19 Opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTC 85 (entered into force 26 June
1987).
20 Opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September
1981).
21 U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2006) 46.
22 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222
(entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 11 (entered
into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990 and 1 November 1998,
respectively).
23 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered
into force 18 July 1978).
24 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21
October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter).
25 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004, reprinted in (2005) 12
International Human Rights Reports 893 (entered into force 15 March 2008).
26 See M. AminAl-Midani and M. Cabanettes (trans.) and S.M. Akram, ‘The Arab Charter on
Human Rights 2004’ (2006) 24 (2) Boston University International Law Journal 147–64.
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Framing the project: critical accounts
The UDHR and the international human rights system, as has already been
implied, is also subject to a range of critiques, some of which are now well
embedded within mainstream human rights scholarship and debate. The
most famous of these reflects cultural relativist arguments deconstructing
the ‘universalism’ of human rights, arguments which emerge from a range
of alternative framing positions, including, most notably, ‘Asian values’,
Islam and postmodernism.27 Within such discursive accounts, there is a
closely related and oft-repeated accusation that the UDHR is an instrument
of ‘Western cultural imperialism’, a mere Trojan horse for the imposition of
‘Western’ commitments upon ‘non-Western’ cultures. This critique is inti-
mately related to the idea that the UDHR is Eurocentric in both origin and
formulation.28
Such critiques, in turn, are addressed by defences of international human
rights universalism resting on a variety of claims. It is argued, for example,
that the UDHR Drafting Committee was more internationally diverse than is
often assumed,29 and that the values in the UDHR reflect at least a thin
convergence or ‘justificatory minimalism’30 centred upon on values viewed
as being common to or at least conceptually derivable from many, if
not most, great human philosophical and religious traditions.31 Donnelly
argues, for example, that ‘Christians, Muslims, Confucians, and Buddhists;
27 See, for examples of discussions canvassing relevant and related arguments, K. Engle,
‘Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context’ (2000) 32 (2) Journal of
International Law and Politics 291–333; H. Samuels, ‘Hong Kong on Women, Asian Values
and the Law’ (1999) 21 (3) Human Rights Quarterly 707–34; A. J. Langlois, The Politics of
Justice and Human Rights: South East Asia and Universalist Theory (Cambridge University
Press 2001); K. Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights, 3rd edn (London:
I. B. Tauris 2007); M. Ignatieff, ‘The Attack on Human Rights’ (2001) 80 Foreign Affairs
102–16; Z. Arslan, ‘Taking Rights Less Seriously: Postmodernism and Human Rights’ (1999)
5 Res Publica 195–215.
28 For example, see M. Matua, ‘Savages, Victims and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human
Rights’ (2001) 42 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 201–46.
29 J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2002) 21.
30 J. Cohen, ‘Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?’ (2004) 12 (2) The
Journal of Political Philosophy 190–213 at 213.
31 A range of perspectives related to this can be found in H. Kung and J.Moltmann, The Ethics of
World Religions and Human Rights (London and Philadelphia, PA: SCM Press, 1990). See also
J. Donnelly, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights’ (2009), Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the
60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Protecting Dignity: An
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Kantians, Utilitarians, Pragmatists, and neo-Aristotelians; liberals, conser-
vatives, traditionalists, and radicals, and many other groups as well, come
to human rights from their own particular path’.32 Moreover, the de facto
universality implied by the almost global-wide international recognition of
the UDHR is also cited as evidence of its contemporary legitimacy as a
common standard of achievement for all peoples. It is pointed out, further-
more, that the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action affirms
universalism, construing it as a value capable of respecting cultural varia-
tion and specificity while at the same time retaining an important primacy
in order to defend against culturally derived violations of the minimum
standards set forth by international human rights norms.33 In this sense, as
Donnelly has argued, we can understand international human rights norms
to be ‘relatively universal’.34
There exist, of course, a range of other critiques – some of which are
related to those already noted. The criticism, for example, that civil and
political rights are incipiently favoured over economic and social rights
within the institutional mechanisms of international human rights law,35 a
fact taken to reflect a fundamental ideological privileging of liberal
constructs of rights descended from the commitments of the ‘West’, remains
painfully apt, particularly in the contemporary globalised context.36 It has
been argued, relatedly, that the entire international human rights law
project stands discursively colonised by the project of neoliberal capitalism
and the hegemonic power of transnational corporations (TNCs) within the
international legal order.37 Such arguments can be linked to earlier
Agenda for Human Right, www.udhr60.ch/report/donnelly-HumanDignity_0609.pdf (date of
last access 15 June 2011). See also J. Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity: An
Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights’ (1982) 76 (2) The American
Political Science Review 303–16.
32 Donnelly, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights’ 7.
33 See Part 1, para. 1 of the Vienna Declaration.
34 J. Donnelly, ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’ (1984) 6 (4) Human Rights
Quarterly 400–19 at 419. But see also the critique of this offered by M. Goodhart, ‘Neither
Relative Nor Universal: A Response to Donnelly’ (2008) 30 (1)Human Rights Quarterly 183–93.
35 See, for an introduction to the depth of the challenge, D. Beetham, ‘What Future for
Economic and Social Rights?’ (1995) 43 (1) Political Studies 41–60.
36 See the excoriating critique of the imperatives of neoliberal globalisation and their
deleterious effect upon the realisation of socio-economic rights offered by Baxi, The
Future of Human Rights.
37 See Baxi, The Future of Human Rights; S. Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilization and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism’ (1995) 24Millennium Journal of International Studies 399–423;
A. Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010).
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criticisms of rights discourse, particularly perhaps to the Marxist claim that
human rights are individualistic tools of the capitalist project.38 Such
critiques, taken together, strongly imply that the hierarchies and asymme-
tries observable in international human rights law (and further reflected, in
substantive terms, by the differing strengths of enforcement mechanisms
available for different categories of rights) reflect agendas far removed from
the affirmation of the equal worth and dignity of all members of the ‘human
family’. This criticism, moreover, remains un-deflected – even in the con-
text of the so-called ‘third-generation’ (or ‘solidarity’) rights, such as the
human right to a clean environment.39
Other telling discrepancies are also noted, centred upon excoriating
denouncements of the selective deployment of international human rights
standards by Western states, particularly in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries: for example, the use of human rights-based justifi-
cations for the ‘legitimation’ of Western (and NATO) incursions into the
sovereignty of certain states, especially those states whose aims and inter-
ests are considered inimical to those of the capitalist ‘West’. There is a
shocking disjunction, for example, between the ‘humanitarian’NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo and abject failure of the Western powers to intervene to
prevent the highly publicised and appalling genocide in Rwanda. Such
discrepant practices are sometimes cited as evidence of a self-serving
Realpolitik deploying the mantle of human rights.40
There are many available critical framings of international human rights
law. In fact, there are somany that the only safe conclusion that we can draw,
as an intermediate matter, is that international human rights law, in both
theory and practice, is riven with contradictions, disputations, rival framings
and oppositional accounts. The mainstream frame or account is vociferously
disputed – and, just as it is challenging to provide a comprehensivemap of the
38 See K. Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, in Selected Essays by Karl Marx (H. J. Stenning,
trans.) (London and New York: Leonard Parsons 1926).
39 A range of problems reflecting the fundamental fracture between the broadly (neo)liberal
ideological commitments so intimately linked to the traditional (and contemporary)
primacy of civil and political rights and the general failure to realise the economic and social
rights of the economically disempowered peoples and nations of the earth replicate
themselves in the context of environmental injustice, including climate change injustice:
See, for more the contributions in (2010) 1 (2) The Journal of Human Rights and the
Environment 131–256.
40 See, for more, C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of
Cosmopolitanism (Abingdon: Routledge–Cavendish 2007).
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main documents and institutional mechanisms of international human rights
law, it is even more difficult, arguably, to provide a complete account of all
the critiques internal and external to international human rights law’s vast
and apparently illimitable discursive field.
An interposition: framing ‘the frames’
What should be noted, at this stage of our reflection, is the contingency of all
the available renderings of international human rights law, mainstream and
critical. All the accounts we have introduced (and those we have not) are
‘framings’. They all come complete with their own epistemic limitations and
closures. However, there is arguably one important general difference observ-
able between ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’ accounts – or, at least, those critical
accounts embracing the inescapability of epistemic limitation – and it is this:
such critical accounts are based on an explicit reflexivity that attempts to
respond to the partiality and contingency of framings themselves.
Generalisations are never safe, but it is possible to assert with some degree
of plausibility nonetheless that many ‘mainstream’ accounts of the inter-
national human rights law project imply a degree of ‘progressiveness’ in the
international human rights law trajectory. Genuinely critical accounts, by
contrast, tend invariably to problematise it – as well as the narratives and
framings on offer. This is not to suggest that critical accounts end in a
terminus of radical, paralysing relativism. Human rights emerge from critical
accounts as ‘ideas’ (albeit powerful, world-shaping ideas) which are revealed
as being semantically elusive ‘placeholder[s] in a global conversation that
allows a constant deferral of the central defining moment in which rights
themselves will be infused with substance’.41 Such accounts emphasise the
sense in which the very meaning of human rights is always ‘up for grabs’.
They amply suggest the ambivalence of human rights: their Janus-faced
capacity for producing and cloaking privilege and yet, simultaneously, their
capacity for the unveiling of oppression. Critical accounts of human rights
underline the sense inwhich human rights are always (to borrow the words of
Douzinas) ‘floating signifiers’:42 their promise constantly draws the human
41 A. Ely-Yamin, ‘Empowering Visions: Towards a Dialectical Pedagogy of Human Rights’
(1993) 15 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 640–85 at 663.
42 C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 2000) 253–61.
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imagination forwards, but is ever-deferred, always ‘not yet’. Meanwhile, their
meaning, as critical accounts stress, remains contestable, semantically unset-
tled, radically porous, open to co-option, colonisation and, importantly,
never, ever above the interplay of power relations.
One contingent re-framing
We have already noted the centrality of the iconic UDHR to the entire edifice
of human rights law and mentioned its production of a universal human
rights bearer. As I have earlier suggested, a central paradox of international
human rights law rests on the construction of this universal ‘human sub-
ject’. Despite the fact that the UDHR clearly enshrines its rights as belonging
to all members of the ‘human family’, to ‘everyone’, it is far from clear that
all human beings as concrete beings find themselves fully embraced or
represented by the universal human rights subject. In fact, there is arguably
a dysfunction or fracture at the heart of the ‘human family’ of the UDHR –
and it is this observation that forms the inspiration for this particular
framing of the international human rights law project.
It is clear on various accounts, including its own, that the UDHR attempts
to respond to the need to protect the human being understood qua human
being. If we combine the emphasis of the UDHR preamble with the language
of Article 2, this inclusive aspiration becomes clear: the invocation of terms
such as ‘everyone’ and ‘the human family’ are supported by the explicit
de-legitimation of forms of discrimination based upon any putative
distinctions or sub-divisions between human beings:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional
or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether
it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty [emphases added].
It is clear from this that no putative basis for distinction, even those centred
upon the nation state itself, should form a legitimate basis for the denial of
human rights. This emphasis is unsurprising in so far as certain scholarship
has revealed the central concern driving the drafters of the Declaration to be
26 Anna Grear
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an explicit reaction to the bio-centric, racist and species-segmenting abuse
of state power by the Nazi state43 (which was itself conceived of as a
species-specific entity: as an ‘Aryan’ organic body of which Hitler was the
head).44 This argument, emerging from Morsink’s careful analysis of the
records of the deliberations of the Drafting Committees,45 is lent further
plausibility by the preamble’s immediate reference to the ‘barbarous acts
that have outraged the conscience of mankind’. Although, inevitably, this
view is contested, it seems relatively clear that the affirmation of the
fundamental commonality of the human race was a conscious aim of the
drafters and that the UDHR explicitly emphasises the unacceptability of
selective segmentations and discriminatory practices and violations,
whether those were primarily driven by awareness of Nazi laws and prac-
tices or were also responding to wider socio-historical patterns and
trajectories.
The UDHR aspiration for human familial inclusion and the explicit
rejection of discrimination based on sub-divisions in the human family is
accompanied, it will be argued here, by an enduring paradox consisting in
the directly contradictory (re-)production, within international human
rights law, of an entire range of outsider or marginalised subjectivities.
The puzzle of this contradictory state of affairs seems to hinge on a
fundamental contradiction inherent in the figuration of the abstract form
of human nature deployed as the ‘universal’ subject of rights.
Linking the abstract human being of the UDHR with the abstract man of
the earlier French Declaration, Douzinas argues that ‘[o]nce the slightest
empirical or historical material is introduced into abstract human nature,
once we move from the declarations onto the concrete embodied person,
with gender, race, class and age, human nature with its equality and dignity
retreats rapidly’.46 We should pause to note, moreover, the patterned nature
of the specificities in relation to which equality and dignity retreat. Such
patterned retreat in the face of embodied empirical and historical particu-
larity is especially troubling for the international human rights law project
for, as Otto suggests, such critique ‘goes to the heart of the post-World War
43 J. Morsink, ‘World War Two and the Declaration’ (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly
357–405 at 357.
44 See Morsink on ‘Hitler’s Organic State and Articles 1 and 2’ (1993 15 Human Rights
Quarterly 359–66); A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (R. Manheim, trans.) (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin 1971) 150.
45 Morsink, ‘World War Two’ 357. 46 Douzinas, The End of Human Rights 96.
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II discourse of universal human rights which, as its most fundamental
premise, purports to apply equally, without distinction, to “everyone”
[(Article 2 UDHR)]. [Despite this t]he allegedly universal subject of human
rights law . . . reproduces hierarchies, including those of [gender], race,
culture, nation, socio-economic status and sexuality.’47
It seems that the universal human rights subject installed at the heart of
the international human rights law project appears to (re-)produce the very
hierarchies and discriminatory patterns that the UDHR itself explicitly
rejects. This presents, clearly, something of a conundrum, and despite the
proliferation (as we have already seen) of a range of ‘identity’-inclusive
documents, such as CEDAW, patterns of marginalisation remain obdurately
real and installed within international human rights law. The evidence for
the reality and impact of these marginalised subjectivities emerges from
various critical positions and sources, but it is worth nothing that even at
the origins of the UDHR, marginalisation was a historically real problem.
For example, women, in particular, were marginalised (almost explicitly) in
the very drafting process: the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)
had to fight hard just to achieve a shift away from the language of the rights
of ‘all men’ towards the rights of ‘all human beings’. This limited conces-
sion, moreover, entailed the explicit rejection of the explicitly sexuate and
inclusive formulation sought by the CSW – that of ‘all people, men and
women’.48 It is of note that the masculine pronoun remains stubbornly
dominant throughout the text of the UDHR, which is also completely silent
on the issues of gendered violence and reproductive rights. Critics have
noted, moreover, that women’s equal rights are semantically tied to the
context of the family (Article 16 UDHR) and that there is a problematic
further muting of women’s rights claims through the traditional liberal
public/private divide (which famously reserves the public domain for men
while relegating women to the ‘private’ domestic sphere) – itself a profound
barrier to genuine female rights enjoyment – and uncritically installed at
the heart of the international human rights law project.49
47 D. Otto, ‘Disconcerting “Masculinities”: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of
International Human Rights Law’, in D. Buss and A. Manji (eds.), International Law: Modern
Feminist Approaches (Oxford: Hart 2005) 105–29 at 105–6. (Emphasis added.)
48 See J. Morsink, ‘Women’s Rights in the Universal Declaration’ (1991) 13 Human Rights
Quarterly 229–56.
49 For more, see F. Beveridge and S. Mullally, ‘International Human Rights and Body Politics’,
in J. Bridgeman and S. Millns (eds.), Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body
(Aldershot: Dartmouth 1995) 240–72.
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In a sense, the very need for CEDAW and other treaties directed at
particular groups or ‘identities’ of rights-claimant reflects the existence of
marginalised and hierarchically constructed subjectivities within inter-
national human rights law. It is precisely the felt/lived sense of exclusion,
hierarchical marginalisation or invisibility that has driven women and a
range of marginalised ‘others’ to seek the specific enumeration of their
rights. This dynamic strongly suggests the (re)production within inter-
national human rights law of what we can with a high degree of accuracy
label as ‘non-universal human subjectivities’ (those deemed inherently
incapable of representing all humanity).
The evidence suggests, though, that the existing universal, far from being
universal in reality, despite its claim to be inclusively representative, is a
radically ‘non-universal universal’, an abstract construct enacting familiar
exclusions historically linked to certain much-criticised conceptual and
ideological features of Western thought.50 In short, the philosophical foun-
dations of the universal human subject enact a certain kind of ‘tilt’. This
point is not without its irony. It has been noted by Morsink that the urgent
ethical humanitarian sensibility driving the UDHR drafters was such that
‘they did not need a philosophical argument in addition to the experience of
the Holocaust’51 in order to justify the UDHR. Yet, despite their ethical
humanitarian energy, their moral outrage and high degree of empathy
with victims of human violation, the drafters of the UDHR, in attempting
to inaugurate a new age of international, ethical and juridical concern
predicated upon the important concept of inclusive universality, turned
(naturally enough perhaps) to the pre-existing formula of abstract univer-
salism enshrined withinWestern philosophy, and in particular, to the iconic
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
The universal subject or ‘man’ of the French Declaration has, of course, its
own philosophical foundations and antecedents. Its formulation, for
example, is radically continuous with the philosophical, political and
rights-based discursivity of John Locke, and with earlier philosophical
assumptions concerning the primacy of ‘man’s nature’ as being quintessen-
tially ‘rational’. The rational man of the French Declaration, as Douzinas’
argument above implies,52 is the direct progenitor of the universal ‘human
50 See Grear, Redirecting Human Rights Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
51 Morsink, ‘World War Two’ 358.
52 Douzinas, The End of Human Rights 46 and related text.
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being’ of the UDHR. In fact, there are extensive continuities between the
UHDR and the earlier Declaration. Marks has argued that the proclamation
of rights in the French Declaration had a ‘major impact on the form and
content of the UDHR proclaimed 160 years later, and subsequently, on the
current codex of internationally recognized human rights’.53 The assertion
that all ‘men are born and remain free and equal in rights’ (Article 1 of the
French Declaration) becomes, in Article 1 UDHR, the statement that all
‘human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ – an almost
identical formulation, as Hunt suggests, but for the exchange of ‘human
beings’ for ‘men’.54 The drafters of the UDHR, reached out, then, for the pre-
existing symbols of a rich human rights imaginary at the heart of which
stood an abstract universal.
The abstract universal ‘man’/’human being’ is conceived of as being
essentially ‘neutral’ – as representative of all humanity. Closer inspection,
however, reveals this ‘neuter’ universal to be a cipher that is never neutral,
never empty, because its essential rationality comes laden with philosophical
and ideological provenance –most especially a long-standing co-imbrication
of rationality and maleness. Inevitably, then, this abstract universal is
gendered. (We have already noted the related struggle of the CSW to change
the language from ‘men’ to that of ‘human beings’ in the UDHR drafting
process.) If we pause to reflect once more on the fact that, as Douzinas points
out, ‘universal’ dignity and equality rapidly retreat once the abstract human
subject takes on materiality or concrete form, we can begin to grasp the
essence and implications of the problem. The universal seems to be
constructed as neutral, yet the retreat of dignity and equality is precisely
along the well-worn conduits of discriminatory species segmentation so
familiar in our long human history of inequalities, diminutions, degradations,
marginalisations, oppressions and violences.
The marginalised subjectivities revealed by such realities suggest, just as a
photographic negative might, the precise contours of the construct covertly
privileged by the neuter-impossibility of the ‘universal one’ of human rights.
53 S. P. Marks, ‘From the “Single Confused Page” to the “Decalogue for Six Billion Persons”:
The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution’ (1998) 20
Human Rights Quarterly 459–514 at 460.
54 L. Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History (New York:
Bedford/St Martin’s Press 1996) 3. The text of the American Declaration of Independence
(1776) declares ‘all men’ to be ‘created equal, [and] endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, [and] among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’.
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The marginalisation of ‘women, humans of colour, children, humans with
disabilities, humans who are older or poor, and those with different sexual
orientations’55 – those with long histories of exclusion – including indige-
nous peoples – point ineluctably towards a hidden ‘insider’ – the ‘one’ who is
most definitely ‘not’ any of these. It is as if a great invisible figure inhabits the
universal. The figure revealed by the patterned retreat of particularity in
international human rights law emerges from the ebb, as ‘natural man’ or
‘natural human being’ – in ‘his’ materialisation, however, bearing a predict-
able set of particularities. ‘He’ (for this is a construct not a living man (despite
the fact that some groups of men have clearly benefited from their (incom-
plete) correspondence with its contours)) emerges as the male, the property-
owning, the European and the white.56 To claim this is simply to insist that
international human rights law, in this particular regard, is no real exception
to the history of rights struggles before it, although this paradox is all the
more troubling in international human rights law, where the issue is both
more complex (the UDHR explicitly denounces discrimination) and more
telling (for the same reason).
History is where ideology breaks cover.57 The paradoxes of the universal
are reflected in a long history of rights settlements, history revealing a
pattern – not just in the UDHR – of rights being born of visceral, critical
reactions against a violently uneven status quo or an immense injustice –
followed by their institutional crystallisation, at which point their radical
potential is muted or foreclosed,58 captured by the power of pre-existing
elites (albeit not completely – thankfully the critical energy of rights is never
entirely exhausted in the process). Even in revolutionary France, where
rights-talk was at its most universalistic and liberationist, the initial institu-
tional settlement strongly reflected the priorities of the powerful: The ‘rights
of man’ were granted, paradigmatically to the male, rational property-
owning citizen – notwithstanding vigorous and open debate concerning
the rights of slaves, Calvinists, Jews and homosexuals and the attempts by
some women to gain rights to active political citizenship.59
55 D. Nibert, Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation
(Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2002) 4.
56 Douzinas, The End of Human Rights 100.
57 SeeM. Horwitz, ‘Comment: The Historical Contingency of the Role of History’ (1981) 90Yale
Law Journal 1057–9.
58 N. Stammers, ‘Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights’ (1999) 21
Human Rights Quarterly 980–1008.
59 Hunt, The French Revolution.
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By the time of the UDHR, as the text itself reflects, there was a widely
accepted awareness of just such past discriminatory patterns – yet – as we
have seen – discriminatory patterns remained installed in the drafting
process itself (almost explicitly, concerning gender), and remain problem-
atically installed within the cognitive and ideological architecture of the
abstract ‘universal subject’ of international human rights. A key challenge
related to these patterns concerns a tendency in abstractionism towards
(incomplete) disembodiment. The construct of the universal human being
simply does not do justice to the full complexity, the sheer fleshy variability
and multiple forms, colours, shapes and sex/genders of the embodied
human personality in all its vulnerability. The thin ‘non-universal univer-
sal’ cannot do justice to the ‘thick’ humanity of the entire human family.
There is, quite simply, no adequate protection in the UDHR for the human
being qua human being, a fact representing a profound ethical failure lying
at the heart of the most putatively humanitarian of rights regimes.
Lest readers think this statement too strong, let us pause to reflect with
Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism on the fact that human rights ‘based
on the assumed existence of a human being as such broke down at the very
moment when those who professed to believe in [them] were for the first time
confronted with people who had lost all other qualities and specific relation-
ships – except that they were still human’.60 This breakdown concerns,
paradigmatically, ‘the refugee’ – the very figure who should most embody
any international human rights subjectivity genuinely founded upon the
radical presence of the human being qua human being as such. Yet Article
14 UDHR, examined closely, fails to guarantee the refugee the right to enter
another country, producing a lacuna signalling the radical failure of the
promise of the universal in the stark light of the very moment when the
promise of full inclusion in the ‘human family’ of the UDHR is most neces-
sary: for those otherwise juridically naked, radically dislocated human beings
fleeing war, economic privation, environmental devastation or tyranny.
Article 14 arguably announces, or amplifies, the dysfunction lying at the
heart of international human rights law concerning the discrepancy between
the avowedly universalist aspirations of the UDHR and the fractured reality of
its patterned (re-)production of marginalised subjectivities.
In Arendt’s terms, the fact that the UDHR fails to embrace the embodied
vulnerable particularity of the human being qua human being, and the fact
60 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt 1971) 299.
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that the UDHR ‘family’ remains haunted by international human rights
law’s multiple ‘others’, signals a ‘void’ at the heart of international human
rights law. This ‘void’ (and its historical and contemporary resonances)
amply suggests, moreover, dark intimations of the radically differential
distributions of life and death in the well-defended patterns and practices
of injustice now characterising our global age of corporate capital preda-
tion.61 Indeed, the spectre of deepening climate injustice and its (as-yet)
differential distribution of privation, immiseration, cultural destruction and
radical human dislocation62 points, if anything, to the continuing salience
of Arendt’s lament.
What use then, we might ask, are international human rights, if they fail
precisely at the point where they are called upon in the very name of the
juridically naked, embodied, vulnerable humanness so poignantly exposed?
Was achieving this very nakedness not the precise aim of the Nazi pro-
gramme of stripping away both citizenship and legal personhood – a
process which assiduously preceded the procedurally regulated extermi-
nation of Jews and other victims in the camps of the Third Reich and which,
through the imposition of ‘juridical death’ opened the way for the practices
of Holocaust so foundational, on one reading at least, to the inception of the
UDHR as an outraged reaction to it?63
How, then, are we to answer this call for human rights meaning?
Arguably, human rights break their promise when they fail to be bearers
of outrage and compassion. It is arguably at the very moment of experi-
enced ‘nakedness’, in the face of the ‘void’ itself, in the ‘felt’ gap between the
‘now’ and the ‘not yet’, in the savage contradiction between human rights
promise and human rights betrayal, which the illimitable energy and para-
dox of human rights returns. For it is in the very experiential realities of the
betrayal of the promise of the universal, in the viscerally felt failures of
inclusion, in the embodied, lived senses of marginalisation, exclusion or
excision that human energies surge back into the space of human rights
failure, articulating new words, breathing (literally) a pain that re-awakens
61 See Baxi, the Future of Human Rights; Gill, ‘Globalisation’; Grear, Redirecting Human
Rights; F. Pearce and S. Tombs, Toxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the Chemical
Industry (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1998).
62 See, e.g., L. Westra, Ecoviolence and the Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2004);
L. Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees (London: Earthscan
2009); L. Westra and B. E. Lawson (eds.), Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues
of Global Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2001).
63 Morsink, ‘World War Two’ 358.
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human rights as an endless contestation concerning the constitution of the
‘human family’. Hope lies, perhaps, in the idea that international human
rights law has not yet exhausted the critical energy of human rights as an
endlessly recursive interaction concerning inclusions and exclusions in
which every inclusion necessarily creates new, unforeseen exclusions, and
in which every lived exclusion births new claims for inclusion. Perhaps in
this sense, we can render legible the ‘void’ of international human rights
law, with Rancière, as being precisely that fragile but persistent space of
hope in which international human rights are ‘the rights of those who have
not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have not’.64
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